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This paper further explores the role of sex ratios on spouses’ bargaining power, by 
focusing on educational attainment in order to capture the qualitative aspect of mate 
availability. Using Census and Current Population Survey data for U.S. metropolitan 
areas in year 2000, a quality sex ratio is constructed by education brackets to test the 
effect on the intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding 
education bracket. We argue that a relative shortage of suitably educated women in the 
spouse’s potential marriage market increases wives’ bargaining power in the household 
while it lowers their husbands’. Additionally, we test the prediction that this bargaining 
power effect is greater as the assortative mating order by education increases. We 
consider a collective labor supply household model, in which each spouse’s labor 
supply is negatively related to their level of bargaining power. We find that higher 
relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple’s metropolitan area 
reduces wives’ labor supply and increases their husbands’. Also, the labor supply 
impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups. No such effects are found for 
unmarried individuals, which is consistent with bargaining theory. 
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This paper examines the effects that quality sex ratios by educational attainment 
have on spouses’ labor supply and bargaining power. There is evidence in the literature 
that the availability of potential mates in local marriage markets, measured by the raw 
number  of  men  relative  to  the  number  of  women,  affects  the  bargaining  power  and 
allocation of resources in already formed couples (e.g. Chiappori et al. 2002, Angrist 
2002). In this study, we want to further explore the role of sex ratios on bargaining power 
by constructing a refined measure of the availability of men and women based on mate 
quality.  We  utilize  educational  attainment,  a  valuable  trait  in  marriage  by  which 
individuals appear to assortatively match, as a qualitative indicator (Weiss and Willis 
1997,  Qian  1998).  We  consider  local  marriage  markets  by  metropolitan  area  and 
construct a sex ratio by three education brackets (high-school graduates, some college 
and college-college plus), within which individuals usually sort. Within the framework of
a collective labor supply household model, we test whether this quality sex ratio affects 
the intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding education bracket 
through an income effect on both spouses (Chiappori et al. 2002). That is, when the sex 
ratio is favorable to the wife, (i.e. there is a relative scarcity of women in her education 
bracket) the distribution of gains from marriage  is shifted in her favor.  In particular, 
according to models of collective household behavior, if a higher number of qualified 
men  in  the  wife’s  marriage  group  of  reference  increases  female  intra-household 
bargaining power, then one would expect a reduction in wives’ labor supply, and an 
increase in husbands’ labor supply. Additionally, we also test the theoretical prediction
that the bargaining power effect of such a sex ratio is greater as the assortative mating 
order by education increases (Iyigun and Walsh 2005).
Do local sex ratios by education group represent an outside opportunity affecting 
spousal bargaining power? Do spouses’ labor supplies depend on what happens in their 
neighborhood? Is it better to be the only educated woman in a world of men? Common 
sense  would  answer  no,  however  matching  theory  and  our  results  actually  yield  the 
opposite answer: one is better off when is in short supply! 
We use Census data by metropolitan area for the year 2000 to build our sex ratios 
and data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the year 2
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2000 to test our labor supply prediction on married couples (using unmarried individuals 
as  control  group).  Our  identification  strategy  consists  of  estimating  the  effects  of 
education  sex  ratios  on  husbands’  and  wives’  labor  supply for  households  that  were 
married prior to the year 2000 and comparing changes in their labor supply behavior 
cross-sectionally across the US metropolitan areas.  
 Our  empirical  analysis  reveals  that  married  women  significantly  reduce  their 
supply  of  market  labor,  while  their  husbands  increase  theirs  as  the  corresponding 
education sex ratio becomes more favorable to women: a decrease of 78 and 166 annual 
hours for “some college” and “college-college plus” wives, respectively, and an increase 
of 53 and 129 in their husbands’ (high-school graduates do not exhibit any significant 
impact). Consistent with the hypothesis of a stronger effect for higher education brackets, 
we  also  find  that  couples  with  “college-college  plus”  wives  exhibit  a  significantly 
stronger impact of the  quality sex  ratio on their bargaining power  than  couples with 
“some college” wives, whose estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is in turn larger than 
that for high school graduates. Our bargaining power interpretation is strengthened by the 
fact that unmarried men and women do not exhibit any significant reaction to the quality 
sex ratio on their labor supply. 
The findings presented here are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios 
increase female bargaining power in the marriage market. Additionally, this evidence 
represents the first empirical support of the bargaining power effect of a quality sex ratio 
by  education,  and  its  stronger  impact  on  couples  with  higher  levels  of  educational 
attainment.
A  number  of  alternative  explanations  are  also  considered.  The  geographical 
variation in the relative number of men and women by education may capture differences 
in local labor market opportunities for women, in marital gains from specialization and in 
welfare programs. Also, our quality sex ratio includes married and same-sex partners, 
who  do  not  represent  available  mates.  We  argue  that  those  phenomena  cannot 
consistently  explain  our  results,  given  their  patterns,  our  intra-household  bargaining 
predictions and the empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical framework.  
Section  III  describes  the  empirical  specification  and  data.  Section  IV  presents  the 3
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empirical results. Section V considers alternative explanations for the findings. Section 
VI concludes the paper.
II. Theoretical Background
There are two strands of economic literature that relate to our study. One strand 
focuses on the impact of distribution factors, such as the sex ratio on intra-household 
bargaining power, and tests their effects on spouses’ labor supply behavior (Chiappori et 
al. 2002, Chiappori et al. 2005). While most empirical research on sex ratios examines 
the  effects  of  marriage,  those  studies  develop  the  collective  household  model  and 
demonstrate theoretically that favorable outside marriage market opportunities increase a 
spouse’s bargaining power through an income effect, measured as a reduction in labor 
supply (the opposite happening to the other spouse). Because married men and women 
have the option of seeking a divorce and re-marrying, more numerous potential mates in 
the spouse’s marriage market of reference should enhance the bargaining power of those 
already married to the extent that it enhances their opportunities outside the marriage 
(Chiappori et al. 2002, Lundberg and Pollak 1996). Our paper specifically refers to this 
theoretical framework. Empirically, Chiappori et al. (2002) find that higher sex ratios 
reduce wives’  labor supply and increase the husbands’,  using 1990 state Census  and 
PSID data. In a study on immigrants to the United States, Angrist (2002) argues that his 
empirical results are consistent  with theories where higher sex  ratios increase  female 
bargaining power in the marriage market. He finds that higher sex ratios are associated 
with lower female labor force participation; the effect is larger where marriage within the 
same ethnic group is more prevalent. Using data at both household and aggregate level, 
Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) and Grossbard-Shechtman and Neideffer (1997) show that 
a sex ratio increase reduces the labor force participation and hours worked of married 
women. Finally, a relevant theoretical result is provided by Iyigun and Walsh (2005), 
who incorporate assortative spousal matching into the collective household model and 
find  that  sex  ratios  have  a  stronger  impact  on  intra-household  allocations  as  the 
assortative rank of couples rises. 
The second strand of literature that relates our paper concerns the spousal sorting 
by  educational  attainment  and  the  gains  to  marriage  from  education.  Spouses  have 4
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increasingly  similar  educational  attainment  than  in  the  past,  especially  among  highly 
educated people (Qian 1998). Mare and Schwartz (2005) report that today husbands and 
wives  are  roughly  4  times  as  likely  to  have  a  spouse  who  shares  their  educational 
background as they are to be married to someone who does not, educational homogamy 
being  particularly  strong  for  college  graduates.  Strong  sorting  based  on  educational 
attainment is also documented by Weiss and Willis (1997), with the additional finding 
that  similarity  in  schooling  increases  marriage  stability.  Schooling  also  has  cross-
productivity effects on spouses; wives’ education is found to increase the productivity 
and wages of their husbands and vice-versa (Tiefenthaler 1997, Benham 1974, Chiappori 
et al. 2005). 
However,  none  of  those  studies explores  how  the  distribution  of  educational 
attainment of men and women in the marriage market affects intra-household bargaining 
power, nor tests whether the impact is increasing with higher educational rank of couples. 
Analyzing those effects of quality sex ratios by education is the focus of our paper.
III. Empirical Specification and Data
Identification Strategy
Our main sample consists of married couples with both spouses between 22 and 
60 years of age. According to the theory, if the scarcity of educated women in the local 
marriage market enhances women’s bargaining power in the household, then the labor 
supply  of  wives  should  decline  and  the  labor  supply  of  their  husbands  should  rise. 
Additionally, couples in higher education categories should experience a stronger impact 
on their labor supplies relative to other education categories. We also consider unmarried 
men  and  women  in  the  same  age  bracket,  focusing  on  singles  as  a  “control”  group. 
Singles’ labor supplies should not be affected by changes in intra-household bargaining 
power
1. We include intact couples only if both spouses are actually present. We exclude 
widowed and separated couples to keep a clear distinction between multiple and one 
decision maker households. For the same reason, we exclude singles that are not the head 
of their own household, even though their sample size significantly decreases.
                                                
1 If they plan to marry in the future they may mildly experience a possible bargaining power effect in 
expected value.5
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The following equations for labor supply were estimated separately for wives and 
husbands: 
m m f m m
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We have also estimated a corresponding labor supply equation for unmarried women and 
men, using the same specification (without spousal variables): 
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EduRatio is our sex ratio, which is constructed by three education categories, two races 
and metropolitan areas.  To each individual,  we  assign the  corresponding ratio  of the 
number of men over the number of women in his/her own race and educational category, 
living in his/her metropolitan area. For couples, our sex ratio, EduRatio corresponds to 
the number of men over women that are of the same race and education category as the 
wife of each household. As to race, we focus on black and white individuals and on 
couples where spouses are of the same race, assuming that the relevant marriage market 
is limited to one’s own race
2. The coefficient of EduRatio will be common to both races, 
since to each observation we assign the sex ratio of its own race, and we include both 
races in our main sample. We consider the following education categories: high-school 
graduates (HS), some college (SC) and college graduate- college plus (CC). HS includes 
people  with  high-school  diploma,  or  equivalent;  SC  includes  individuals  with  some 
college, but no degree or associate degree; and CC refers to bachelor’s degree and above. 
We  exclude  high-school  dropouts  from  our  analysis  because  our  sample  should  be 
homogeneous,  and  high-school  dropouts  are  reported  to  have  different  traits, 
socioeconomic  characteristics  and marriage market  prospects  from  graduates (Wolpin 
1999,  Rumberger  1983).  Moreover,  the  hardest  marriage  market  barrier  to  cross  is 
between dropouts  and high school graduates (Qian 1998). We  compute our sex ratio 
including men and women aged 18 to 64. It is reported that measures of the sex ratio 
                                                
2 Our results are robust to the inclusion of Asians, with the white sex ratio as marriage market of reference 
for them.6
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based on broad age ranges are satisfactory and may be preferable to sex ratios computed 
for narrower age ranges (Fosset and Kiecolt 1991)
3.
The interactions of EduRatio with the dummy variables for the education brackets 
SC and CC (dySC and dyCC) capture the differential effect of our sex ratio for higher 
education categories. The education dummies refer to the education of the wife. Our 
identification  strategy  of  the  bargaining  power  effect  consists  of  estimating  the 
coefficient  of  EduRatio  and  capturing  the  differential  effect  by  education  category 
through the coefficients of the interaction terms. The impact of the education sex ratio on 
the labor  supply  of  high-school  graduates is  captured by the  coefficient  of EduRatio 
(impact for the omitted category). The summation of this coefficient and the coefficient 
of the interaction term SC (CC) measures the impact of the education sex ratio on the 
labor  supply  of  some-college  (college-college  plus)  people.  Therefore, checking  the 
significance of the interaction terms tests for the additional impact on couples in the SC 
(CC) category.
The other regressors are the wage rate 
i w (of spouse i or of unmarried individual 
u), household non-labor income y, and X.  X includes age, experience, education of each 
spouse,  a  dummy  variable  for  race,  number  of  household  members  and  number  of 
(young) children in the family. X also includes state unemployment rate, state total labor 
force participation and female labor force participation (with children younger than six), 
to control for the level of economic activity in a state and especially for employment 
opportunities. We add two measures of the prevalence of same-sex unmarried households 
by metropolitan area, for homosexuals and for lesbians, in order to keep our education 
sex  ratio  as  closely  related  to the  heterosexual  marriage  markets  as  possible.  The 
dependent variable in  our  labor supply regressions  is  annual hours worked,  which  is 
defined as total annual hours worked on the longest job held in 1999. Only households in 
which both spouses have positive hours of work are included in our samples. All female 
                                                
3 Research shows that people consider mates drawn from relatively broad age ranges. While mean age 
differences between husbands and wives are relatively small, there is considerable variation around this 
central tendency as many marriages involve larger age differences. Competition and substitution across age 
categories is considerable (Fosset and Kiecolt 1993). Sex ratios accounting for wives being younger than 
husbands are reported to have the same impact (Chiappori et al. 2002). We also computed the sex ratio for 
the age bracket 18 to 44 and got similar results. 7
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labor supply regressions also exhibit the same results when run with Heckman MLE to 
correct for sample selection.  
The labor supply estimation uses robust standard errors clustered by metropolitan 
area, which allow for correlation of household observations within metropolitan areas. 
Our specifications do not use a differences-in-differences estimator since husbands’ and 
wives’ regressions, as well as singles’, are run separately from one another. As such, they 
should not suffer from the understated standard errors highlighted by Bertrand, Duflo, 
Mullainathan 2004. At any rate, clustering by metropolitan area should rectify such an 
underestimation, if at all present. 
We assume sorting within education brackets. We computed the extent of sorting 
in our own sample, and found that the spouses’ correlation across education brackets is 
about .53, and 58 % of our couples have spouses within the same bracket (high-school 
graduates, some college and college-college plus). Those figures are very similar to the 
literature  acknowledging  education  assortative  mating,  so  our  assumption  seems 
plausible.  In  fact,  Weiss  and  Willis  (1997)  find  that  the  correlation  in  educational 
attainments of spouses is on average .57 and report that this strong correlation is similar 
in magnitude to the correlations found in many other samples in the United States and 
other countries. We  further checked for  sorting  by education  brackets by empirically 
testing whether spouses in our main sample are at all affected by sex ratios of other 
education groups. A labor supply regression with one sex ratio for each education bracket 
and no interaction term yields a non-significant impact of those ratios for either spouse. 
We interpret this outcome as evidence of marital sorting within education brackets
4. 
Data
Estimation  is carried out  on  the March Supplement  of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) for the year 2000. The 2000 U.S. Census is used to construct our education 
sex ratio by education brackets, race, and age groups. Husbands and wives from single-
family households were extracted from the CPS into separate files. Records in these files 
were then matched on the household ID code to create a single observation for each 
                                                
4 We also tried to include one sex ratio for each education bracket in our main specification and found the 
same pattern of results for our EduRatios of interest and three non-significant coefficients for the additional 
common ratios.8
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married couple. Data on labor force activity, income and any variable of interest at the 
household  level  are  taken  from  the  March  Supplement,  to  which  we  merge  data  on 
education ratios from the Summary File 4 of the Census. Summary File 4 (SF4) contains 
information compiled from the questions asked to a sample of all people and housing 
units and is released as individual files for each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and for the United States overall. We use the cross-tabulations by sex, age, 
race and educational attainment to construct separate education ratios for the black and 
white population, aged 18 to 64 by metropolitan area
5. There are 276 U.S. metropolitan 
areas  excluding  Puerto  Rico.  Merging  those  to  the  CPS  data  and  excluding  the 
metropolitan ratios’ outliers (top and bottom 2 %) leave us with 173 metropolitan areas.
The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and female labor force 
participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The two measures of the 
prevalence of same-sex unmarried households come from table PCT21 of SF4 and are at 
the  metropolitan  level.  The  Census  records  a  household  as  a  same-sex  union  if  the 
relationship to the householder is specified as “unmarried partner”. We construct two 
ratios, the number of homosexual unions out of the total number of households and the 
number  of  lesbian  unions  out  of  the  total  number of  households.  In  our  sample,  the 
covariate  education  is  derived  from  the  education  categories  that  the  CPS  provides
6. 
Finally, CPS weights are used to make the sample representative of the US population 
and economy.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables by demographic. 
In our sample, men on average work more annual hours than women and earn a higher 
hourly wage, while they have very similar levels of education. On average, husbands are 
two years older than wives. As to our education sex ratio by metropolitan area, there are 
more white women graduating from high school, or having some college education, than 
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program; bachelor’s degree; master’s degree; professional school degree and doctorate degree.9
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white men. On the other hand, there are more white men than women holding a college 
degree or above. The pattern is somewhat different for the black population: fewer black 
women hold a high school diploma relative to black men but they are more numerous in 
the “some college” and “college-college plus” categories.
IV. Results
IV.1 Main evidence
The main results are shown in Table 2. The estimated effects of our quality sex 
ratio  are  positive  for  husbands  and  negative  for  wives,  as  predicted  by  the  theory. 
Additionally, couples with CC wives exhibit a stronger response to the quality sex ratio 
on their bargaining power than couples with “some college” wives. In turn, SC wives 
estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is  larger than for high school graduates wives. The 
point estimates in our sample indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the education 
sex ratio reduces SC wives’ annual labor supply by about 7.8 hours (p-value = .01), while 
their husbands’ is increased by 5.4 hours per year (p-value = .006). As to couples with 
CC wives, their coefficients for the education sex ratio show a decline in wives’ labor 
supply by 16.6 hours (p-value = .009), and an increase in their husbands’ by 13.0 hours 
per year (p-value = .005). The evidence clearly shows that for both husbands and wives 
the  estimates  for  the  “college-college  plus”  are  greater  than  for  “some  college”,  the 
coefficients being statistically different from each other for each spouse. This suggests 
that  changes  in  the  sex  ratio  of  one’s  education  group  have  a  stronger  effect  on 
bargaining power if one is highly educated. 
The  signal  conveyed  by  the  education  sex  ratio  about  the  quality  of  outside 
marriage market opportunities is more powerfully received by highly educated wives and 
husbands because education is positively related to other important mate attributes such 
as wealth, income and success in life. The availability of valuable mates in the marriage 
market represents a more credible threat for spouses that are per se high-quality mates 
than the sex ratio for lower education brackets. This is in line with the prediction by 
Iyigun, Walsh (2005), in which imbalances in the sex ratios become more relevant for 
intra-household allocations as the rank of couples in the assortative order rises, measured 
here  by  educational  attainment.  Moreover,  our  results  also  match  evidence  in  the 10
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literature of stronger educational homogamy for highly educated men and women (Qian 
1998). For instance, today college graduates have become increasingly likely to marry
one another rather than marry non-college graduates.  The probability of having a spouse 
with the same educational background is 4 times higher than the possibility of marrying 
to someone who does not (Mare, Schwartz 2005). Finally, high-school graduates do not 
show any significant response to changing ratios
7.
As to the size of our sex ratio effects, those changes correspond to a 4.4 (9.3) 
percent  reduction  of  the  average  annual  hours  worked  by  “some  college”  (“college-
college plus”) married women
8 and to a 2.3 (5.7) percent increase for their corresponding 
husbands’. These effects are sizable, given the acknowledged rigidities in the husbands’ 
labor supply and the frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of 
work per week.  In particular, the impact on husbands  is  remarkable since traditional 
family analyses do not emphasize husbands’ response to the sex ratio, even less so, their 
labor supply increasing with it. 
We also estimated the impact of our quality sex ratio on a sub-sample of couples 
that did actually sort  in marriage by education bracket, i.e. on couples where wives’ 
education belongs to the same education bracket as their husbands’. We found a similar 
pattern of results as in our main specification. 
The  bargaining  power  effect  is  also  estimated  on  unmarried  individuals, 
separately  for  men  and  women.  Their  labor  supply  regressions  show  no  significant 
impact of the education sex ratio, as theory would predict. Both men and women exhibit 
economically  negligible  and  statistically insignificant  coefficients  of  the  sex  ratio  by 
education brackets and of its interactions (Table 2). No additional impact is found for 
“some college” and “college-college plus”. At any rate, all their coefficients are different 
from the couples’ sample, which emphasizes the bargaining power effect on husbands 
and wives. Only the coefficient concerning the impact on high-school graduates has a 
                                                
7 Couples where the wife is a high-school graduate do not seem to be affected by the relative number of 
men and women that are high-school graduates in their metropolitan area. The absence of such a bargaining 
power effect may be due to the lack of sorting behavior by this demographic group; it may also be due to 
strong rigidities in the labor supply schedules of such low-educated couples. See subsection IV for a more 
detailed discussion.
8 This decline in wives’ labor supply does not appear to be driven by women less attached to the labor force 
being in the labor  market and working fewer hours. Female participation in the labor  market does not 
exhibit any positive significant impact of the bargaining power effect of the quality sex ratio.11
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large  magnitude,  especially  for  single  men.  However,  the  coefficients  are  never 
significant and the singles’ very small sample size may explain the imprecise estimate
9.
The empirical results are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase 
female bargaining power in the marriage market. Furthermore, this evidence represents 
the  first  empirical  support  of  the  bargaining  power  effect  of  a  quality  sex  ratio  by 
education and of its stronger impact especially as higher levels of educational attainment 
are considered. Further evidence presented below, together with the discussion of various 
alternative explanations, should help making this claim convincing.
IV.2 Race 
Running  our  main  labor  supply  specification  on  the  sub-sample  of  white 
couples yields the same results as the full sample regressions (Table 4). The education 
sex ratio
10 has a negative effect on wives’ labor supply and positive effects on husbands’, 
with  a  significantly  stronger  impact  for  the  “college-college  plus”  than  for  “some 
college”. The coefficient of high-school graduates is not significant. Specifically, “some 
college” wives experience a reduction in their annual hours of 76.6 (p-value = 0.03) while 
their spouses increase theirs by 42.2 (p-value = 0.05). Moreover, wives in the highest 
education category reduce their annual hours worked by 171.7 hours (p-value = 0.01), 
and their spouses experience an increase of 136.3 annual hours (p-value = 0.01). The very 
small black population in the CPS didn’t allow us to run the same regressions for only 
black couples. Nevertheless, in our full sample, we ran a similar regression to check 
whether the bargaining power effect of our within-race quality sex ratio varies across 
races. Each of the three variables concerning the sex ratio by education is interacted with 
a dummy variable for race, in order to capture a possible differential effect. No evidence 
of a different impact across races was detected; however, the several sex ratio coefficients 
in that regression became highly collinear. 
IV.3 Impact for older and younger couples 
                                                
9 The estimated negative coefficient for single women and positive for single men may be due to some of 
them planning to marry in the future and thus mildly experiencing a possible bargaining power effect in 
expected value (although not different across education brackets). 
10 For the white sub-sample, EduRatio is computed using data only for white men and women.12
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The bargaining power effect of our sex ratio by education is also estimated on 
sub-samples of older couples and younger couples, using the same specification as above. 
We actually find an interesting pattern (Table 3). Couples in their late thirties and above 
exhibit a stronger impact of the sex ratio for “some college” than in the entire sample, 
and an even higher response for the “college-college plus” category, especially for wives. 
The associated decline in wives’ labor supply is 82 annual hours for SC and 259 annual 
hours  for  CC.  The  role  of  high-school  graduates  sex  ratio  is  still  negligible. On  the 
contrary, for couples in their twenties and early thirties the bargaining power effect is 
significant for high-school graduates while not being different across education brackets, 
and it is greater than all the coefficients for the entire sample and for the “old” sub-
sample (the decline in wives’ labor supply is 750). We believe that those results reflect 
different  informational  values  about  the  quality  of  potential  mates  that  educational 
attainment conveys at different stages of life. When young, education is not yet a good 
predictor of quality such as wealth and success in life because one hasn’t had time to 
extract the benefits from education yet. The sex ratio in one’s education group matters, 
also for high-school graduates, but there is no stronger impact for high brackets because 
more  education  cannot  convey  much  more  prosperity  information.  Also,  high-school 
graduates do show a sorting behavior, probably because at such  young an age, high-
school graduates are actually more likely to marry individuals in their education category, 
if not  because they know  and interact  with  more such people.  Instead, at older ages 
education becomes a better proxy for economic prosperity because there was time to 
establish social status and wealth. Especially if one has a high educational attainment, the 
signal given by the education sex ratio is very quality-informative, so that the effect of 
such  outside  marriage  market  opportunities  on  bargaining  power  is  very  strong. 
Education matters more in marriage choices when prosperity is directly at stake: this is 
the case for “older” couples looking at their marriage prospects, since the benefits from 
education are already present. Evidence from the literature actually suggests that later age 
at union promotes stronger educational homogamy. In particular, men and women aged 
30  or  above  are  less  likely  to  be  with  partners  with  a  different  level  of  educational 
attainment than are persons in their twenties (Qian 1998).13
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IV.4 High-school graduates
Bargaining power in households where the wife is a high-school graduate does 
not seem to be affected by the relative number of men and women that are high-school 
graduates in their metropolitan area. Possibly, those individuals do not exhibit assortative 
sorting behavior by education because the bracket is too narrow and they may also look 
for  mates  “above”,  in  the  “some  college”  pool.  To  test  this  hypothesis,  we  thus 
constructed a modified quality sex ratio, in which couples with a high-school graduate 
wife are associated with the sex ratio of high-school graduates plus “some college” men 
and  women.  We  kept  the  assumptions  about  the  assortative  mating  of  the  other  two 
groups of individuals “some college” and “college-college plus”. There is no evidence to 
support  the  hypothesis.  The  bargaining  power  effect  for  them  is  not  significant  for 
husband or wife, while for “some college” and “college-college plus” couples it remains 
significant,  and  with  an  increasing  impact  along  educational  brackets.  High-school 
graduates do not  appear  to  “think” assortatively  in  terms of outside  marriage market 
opportunities or match with “some college” individuals. We suggest that this lack of an 
education sex ratio effect on current high-school graduates could be due to the fact that 
high-school graduates do not have good marital prospects in terms of their educational 
attainment, so they just do not sort and are not affected by the specific quality dimension 
“education”. This is in line with the empirical evidence from the literature that mainly 
highly  educated  men  and  women  are  likely  to  marry  each  other  (Qian  1998). 
Additionally, it is compatible with the theoretical prediction (Iyigun Walsh 2005) of an 
increasing bargaining power effect of the sex ratios as the assortative order rises, which is 
empirically supported by our main results: for low ranks such as high-school-graduates, 
the impact can be negligible.
V. Alternative explanations
Sex ratios as proxy of local labor market opportunities
It may be possible that the labor supply of married women falls not as a result of 
the bargaining power effect of mate availability by education brackets, but due to poor 
local  economic  opportunities  for  women.  High  values  of  our  quality  sex  ratio  by 
metropolitan area may suggest male workers outnumbering female workers and a local 14
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labor market with gloomy perspectives in female opportunities. Similarly, it could be that 
more educated women, whose labor supply is high, live in metropolitan areas where there 
are better job opportunities for them, so that the negative coefficient of our education 
ratio represents labor market fluctuations instead of bargaining power. There are at least 
three  reasons  to  believe  that  local  economy  does  not  provide  a  plausible  alternative 
explanation  for  our  findings.  First,  our  labor  supply  regressions  include  individuals’ 
wages and experience, state unemployment rate, total labor force participation rate and 
female labor force participation rate, which help account for the effects of variation in 
labor market opportunities, specifically for women. Second, it is difficult to understand 
why the labor supply of men married to those women, but not other men, should be 
higher in those metropolitan areas if it were just a labor market fluctuation. Third, single 
women with similar demographic and labor market characteristics did not experience the 
same impact of the sex ratios as married women. 
Sex ratio including married and same-sex partners
It may seem that our education sex ratio does not capture the actual availability of mates 
in a local marriage market because both married individuals and same-sex partners, are 
included in the computation of our variable. Its lack of significance in our unmarried 
samples  may  be  attributed  to  large  percentages  of  unmarried  men  or  women  having
same-sex partners. We believe that our ratio of the total number of men and women 
present in a metropolitan area does represent a reliable sex-ratio for three main reasons. 
First, there is considerable evidence in the literature that relatively little benefit is realized 
from refinements such as computing sex ratios separately by marital status (Fosset and 
Kiecolt  1991;  Freiden  1974).  Second,  we  control  for  the  prevalence  of  same-sex 
unmarried  households  using  Census  data  and  constructing  two  ratios:  the  number  of 
homosexual  relationships  out  of  the  total  number  of  households  and  the  number  of 
lesbian relationships out of the total number of households. With those measures at the 
metropolitan area, we make sure that our education sex ratio is an index of the tightness 
of the heterosexual marriage markets. Finally, to the extent that the sizes of the male and 
female homosexual populations vary together, their impact on the validity of the sex ratio 
would be reduced (Fosset and Kiecolt 1991). 15
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Marital gains from specialization
It is well known that if the education of the husband is higher than the wife’s, there are 
gains from the wife specializing in household production and thus working less in the 
labor market (Becker 1981, Chiappori et al. 2006). Our quality sex ratio may capture the 
presence  of  those  gains,  showing  that  when  the  education  gap  of  married  couples 
increases  (i.e.  the  number  of  highly  educated  men  increases,  married  women’s  labor 
supply decreases and their husbands’ increases). However, this link cannot represent an 
alternative explanation to our bargaining power interpretation for three reasons. First, our 
sample consists of already married couples, and the sex ratio counts all men and women 
regardless of their marital status, while the specialization effect should be present only for 
couples  formed  after  any  sex  ratio  change.  When  we  restrict  our  sample  to  “older” 
couples,  likely  to  have  married  many  years  prior  to  2000,  our  bargaining  power 
interpretation  still  holds.  Second,  we  consider  positive  assortative  mating  within 
education brackets, so that men and women are affected by fluctuations in the sex ratio 
only in their own education group. In this case, the education gap of potential spouses, 
and the corresponding gains from specialization would be very small. Third, when we 
restrict our sample to couples that did indeed perfectly sort by those education brackets, 
(i.e. no peculiar gain from specialization should be present for them) our results still hold.  
Welfare programs for women
Welfare programs favorable to women may discourage female labor supply or 
increase  the  bargaining  power  of  married  women  by  enhancing  the  value  of  single 
motherhood.  However,  by  definition,  welfare  programs  benefit  only  low-income 
households, while our results  hold  for all levels  of income.  In particular, when  low-
income households are removed from our samples, there is still a significant decrease in 
married women’s labor supply and increase in their husbands’, with differential impacts 
across education brackets, also in the white sub-sample. Additionally, there is no reason 
why the pattern of the main welfare benefits such as AFDC, EITC and mandated benefits 
should vary across metropolitan areas to be more favorable to women in areas where 
women are relatively scarce. Regardless, the controls for income, wages, and number of 16
16
children should capture welfare mechanisms and effects of welfare eligibility in our main 
regressions. 
VI. Conclusions
This  paper  further  explores  the  role  of  sex  ratios  on  bargaining  power,  by 
constructing a quality sex ratio by education brackets and testing whether it affects the 
intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding education brackets, 
within the framework of a collective labor supply household model. Additionally, we also 
test  the prediction that  the bargaining power  effect of our sex  ratio is greater as the 
assortative mating order by education increases. Using CPS and Census data for year 
2000,  we find that married women significantly reduce their supply of market labor,
while their husbands increase theirs as the corresponding education sex ratio becomes 
more favorable to women. Consistent with the hypothesis of a stronger effect for higher 
education brackets, couples with “college-college plus” wives exhibit a stronger impact 
of  the  quality  sex  ratio  on  their  bargaining power  than  couples  with  “some  college” 
wives, whose estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is in turn larger than for high-school 
graduates. Our bargaining power interpretation is strengthened by the fact that unmarried 
men and women do not exhibit any significant impact of the sex ratio on their labor 
supply. Alternative explanations such as local labor market opportunities, marital gains 
from specialization, welfare programs, and inclusion of married and same-sex partners in 
the sex ratio, are rejected. 
The findings presented here are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios 
increase female bargaining power in the marriage market. Additionally, this evidence 
represents the first empirical support of the bargaining power effect of a quality sex ratio 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
                   White                 Black
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Education Ratio High School Graduates  0.98 0.06 1.22 0.63
Education Ratio Some College  0.89 0.04 0.94 0.43
Education Ratio College and above 1.02 0.06 0.95 0.48
Number of observations 173 173
                   Couples
Variable         mean  std. dev
Hours worked by wife* 1775.59 679.24
Hours worked by husband* 2287.7 510
Log of wage of wife* 2.55 0.66
Log of wage of husband* 2.93 0.56
Age of husband 40.9 8.13
Age of wife 38.9 7.97
Education of husband 14.3 2.28
Education of wife 14.2 2.15
Household non-labor income 5396.18 13685.73
Number of  children below age 6 0.34 0.63
Number  of family members 3.39 1.15
Dummy for black 0.1 0.3
Number  of observations 6198
                  Single Women                   Single Men
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Hours worked* 1792.02 630.98 2122.07 556.56
Log of wage* 2.24 0.66 2.63 0.53
Age 33.35 8.01 37.1 8.27
Education 13.29 1.69 13.71 2.11
Household non-labor income 3016.43 5789.97 4326.6 9537.48
Number of children below age 6 0.47 0.69 0.1 0.39
Number of family members 2.73 1.01 2.38 0.84
Dummy for black 0.59 0.49 0.32 0.46
Number of observations 540 129
The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000 and U.S. Census 2000. 
*For women and men with positive hours of work.  20
20
Table 2.  Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked, Couples and Singles
Estimated Coefficient / robust standard errors / sample size (significant estimates in bold)
      Wives Husbands
Edu Ratio -65.32 -86.68
(-89.87) (-96.13)
Edu Ratio*dy SC -78.29 53.56
(-30.01) (19.33)
Edu Ratio*dy CC -166.21 129.80
(-62.87) (46.05)
Number  of observations 6198 6198
        Single Women  Single Men
Edu Ratio 186.71 784.78
(271.31) (707.54)
Edu Ratio*dy SC -29.56 -109.27
(99.45) (246.57)
Edu Ratio*dy CC 37.36 -431.90
(242.40) (316.20)
Number  of observations 540 129
The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000  
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section III
Single individuals are defined as those with marital status "never married".21
21
Table 3.  Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked, White Couples
Estimated Coefficient / robust standard errors / sample size (significant estimates in bold)
      Wives Husbands
Edu Ratio 78.42 -179.71
(178.04) (152.75)
Edu Ratio*dy SC -76.58 42.17
(35.19) (21.79)
Edu Ratio*dy CC -171.71 136.29
(69.31) (52.51)
Number  of observations 5762 5762
The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000  
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section III.
Table 4.  Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked by Wives, by Age Group
Estimated Coefficient / robust standard errors / sample size (significant estimates in bold)
Young couples Old Couples
Edu Ratio -750.33 26.96
(363.82) (83.65)
Edu Ratio*dy SC -113.90 -82.13
(75.14) (34.09)
Edu Ratio*dy CC 30.33 -259.54
(144.90) (88.67)
Number  of observations 1204 4074
The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000  
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section III.
Young couples are those with wives aged 22 to 31 and husbands aged 25 to 35; old couples wives are aged 32 to 55 and husbands 37 to 57.NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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